First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The aim of the essay is to devise a logic of conditionality which escapes the paradoxes which arise when the general conditional is identified with the universalization of the material conditional. The assumption I adopt is that the logic of one contingent form differs from that of another to the extent that the two forms have different confirmations and disconfirmations. The logic of conditionals is not, But that of their confirmations and disconfirmations is, At bottom truth-Functional; and the logical relations (...) between conditionals, And between conditionals and non-Conditionals, May be traced through the truth-Functional connections between their respective confirmations and disconfirmations. The approach necessitates the re-Definition of the notions of confirmation and entailment. A peculiarity of the system which emerges is that from it can be derived, Without existential assumptions, The twenty-Four valid forms of the syllogism, The relationships of the square of opposition and the other commonly accepted inferences of traditional logic. (shrink)

This paper first appeared in Modern Theology, Vol. 6, No. 3, July 1989. Copyright (c) Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd., Oxford. Reprinted by permission.